Yesterday, March 14, the International Criminal Court (ICC) found Thomas Lubanga Dyilo guilty of recruiting and using child soldiers between 2002 and 2003 during the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Lubanga was convicted of “conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities.” This landmark decision is the ICC’s first verdict since its creation a decade ago.

Lubanga was leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) and the commander-in-chief of its military wing, the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) in the Ituri region of eastern Congo. He was found to be a co-perpetrator in these crimes through his overall role in coordinating the UPC/FPLC activities and measures he took to recruit children under the age of 15 as part of an effort to establish and maintain military and political control over the region.

A separate sentencing hearing will be held and Lubanga could face life in prison. He has 30 days within receiving the French translation of the Judgment to appeal the conviction.

Reaction to the verdict has generally been positive. The Court has been praised for delivering justice to the victims and moving a step closer toward removing the impunity that has long existed for crimes committed under international law. Some, however, have criticized the proceedings for being protracted and costly, and expressed disappointment that Lubanga was not charged with any sexual violence crimes despite widespread allegations that his armed forces raped women and girls throughout the conflict, forcing some into sexual slavery. Overall, the trial and its verdict have shone a much needed spotlight on the horrific crimes of Congo’s civil war, and are an important milestone for those seeking justice and accountability for the world’s worst crimes.

Learn more about the trial and verdict.

By Laura Seay

Three months after presidential and parliamentary elections and despite new members of the National Assembly having assumed their posts, the Democratic Republic of Congo still faces its most significant political crisis since the 2002 end of its international and civil wars. Opposition leader and head of the UDPS party Etienne Tshisekedi and his supporters firmly believe that he won the disputed November 28 elections, in which victory was claimed by incumbent President Joseph Kabila despite widespread reports of electoral fraud and intimidation. Leaders of the country’s powerful Catholic Church are also backing Tshisekedi’s challenge to Kabila’s legitimacy.

Despite having scheduled several protest marches, strikes, and his own presidential inauguration ceremony, however, Tshisekedi and his allies have yet to mobilize enough popular support to pose a significant challenge to Kabila’s rule. Tshisekedi has largely been kept under de facto house arrest since early December. His supporters who have attempted to rally in Kinshasa and other opposition stronghold cities have been prevented from doing so by Congo’s elite Presidential Guard and other security forces, which have not hesitated to use violence and tear gas against UDPS supporters. Tshisekedi responded to this violence by ordering his party’s deputies not to attend the parliamentary session currently underway and by continuing to refuse to recognize the Kabila government’s legitimacy.

Tshisekedi has few friends in this fight. While his support from the Congolese Diaspora in the United States and Europe is strong, Western actors in Kinshasa have largely concluded that little can be done in this crisis and seem content to let Kabila remain in power for another five years. While almost everyone outside of Kabila’s government agrees that the elections were clearly neither free nor fair, diplomats and other observers in the region rightfully point out that there is no data that could give a reasonable degree of certainty as to who actually won the polls. Holding another round of elections is financially and logistically unfeasible, and aside from the fact that Kabila would be almost entirely unlikely to allow it to happen, there is little appetite in the United Nations and among donors to support a second attempt.

But are the donors right? Many Congo watchers argue that the donors’ arguments on this issue present a false dichotomy. That we do not know who won the elections does not mean that there are no alternatives to accepting the results as they were officially announced. Indeed, donor states have at least some opportunities to exercise leverage and to pressure Kabila to negotiate with the opposition and to improve democratic institutions and practices in the DRC. Donated funds constitute a significant portion of the Congolese budget, for example, and there is no reason that donors could not tie this aid to improved governance outcomes, including organizing the forthcoming local elections in a more fair and open manner. Donors could also fund investigations into what went wrong during the 2011 elections and what factors – including massive corruption – must be immediately addressed to avoid another electoral crisis in the future.

Could donors pressure Kabila to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with Tshisekedi and other opposition leaders? Yes, but this is unlikely to yield results, as neither Kabila nor Tshisekedi believe they should have to share power. Internationally-negotiated power-sharing solutions have not worked well in Zimbabwe or Kenya, and there is little reason to think that such a strategy would work in the DRC, especially given that Congolese political institutions are significantly weaker than their counterparts even in Zimbabwe. The death of Kabila’s trusted advisor and master political and economic manipulator, Augustin Katumba Mwanke, in a Bukavu plane crash earlier this month, has left a great deal of uncertainty as to who will make critical decisions as the country moves forward. It is a time of great uncertainty for Kabila, his allies, and all Congolese, which means that it is also an ideal time for donors to show that they will use their leverage to force changes in what is an increasingly authoritarian state.

Congo has not yet reached the point of a Cote d’Ivoire-style violent crisis, and for that, the international community should be grateful. We have not seen the massive atrocities, crimes against humanity, or a full-scale civil war many analysts feared in the lead-up to the elections. However, growing repression against those who dissent politically – be it Tshisekedi’s unofficial house arrest, the assassination of journalists, or the torture of low-level functionaries who publicly criticize the administration – is a sign that democracy in the DRC is far from consolidation. The time to put Congo back on course is now.

Laura Seay is an assistant professor of political science at Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia where she teaches courses on African politics, conflict, and international affairs. She also maintains an academic blog examining Africa politics, security, development and advocacy at: texasinafrica.blogspot.com. The views expressed here are her own.

First, the good news: in the wake of the Democratic Republic of Congo's disputed presidential election, we have yet to see any instances of mass violence. That's about the only good news, however. Tensions are high, the opposition has rejected the official election results (which gave 49% to incumbent President Joseph Kabila), and opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi is openly calling on the army to defect to his side and asking them to bring Kabila to him alive. Tshisekedi believes that he won the election with 56% of the vote and has planned his own inauguration ceremony in the capital this Friday. Kabila, meanwhile, will be inaugurated on Tuesday. Tshisekedi and other opposition leaders have called on the Congolese to make Tuesday a day of “ghost cities,” wherein everything will be quiet as people stay home in protest.

The Congo’s opposition leaders have been very careful to push for peaceful resistance to Kabila’s re-inauguration, but it is unclear if the peace will hold. Security services loyal to Kabila are making a strong show of force in Kinshasa (a Tshisekedi stronghold) and other major cities. They have thus far met attempted protests with a swift and violent response, meaning that protests in the country have been very limited so far, though UN media outlet Radio Okapi reports today that a group of pro-opposition women have been able to stage a peaceful sit-in outside of the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa in the name of urging the international community to take action.

This makes for a dangerous situation. Both Kabila and Tshisekedi are under tremendous pressure from the international community to keep the situation in DRC peaceful moving forward, and to keep their supporters under control. However, given that Kabila’s forces are preventing most types of protest – peaceful or otherwise – it is unclear whether Tshisekedi or anyone else will be able to keep opposition supporters from resorting to violence to make their voices heard. Few Congolese want violence, but if there is no outlet for peaceful expression of disagreement with the official election outcomes, some could resort to that path. The opposition did challenge the results at the country’s Supreme Court, but the Court (which is heavily stacked with Kabila supporters) found in favor of the official results, meaning that there are no further legal means by which to challenge them.

Outside of Kabila’s administration, there is widespread agreement among domestic and international observers that the Congolese elections were deeply flawed and marked with serious instances of fraud, particularly in the vote tabulation stage. The Carter Center, the European Union, the United States, the Congolese Catholic Church, and other observer groups have all issued critical statements noting that the results lack credibility. As such, a cloud hangs over Kabila’s scheduled Tuesday inauguration and Tshisekedi’s plans for a parallel ceremony. It is highly unlikely that Tshisekedi will be able to leave his house for Saturday’s events, much less hold an inauguration ceremony in the 80,000-seat Stade des Martyrs as is his stated intention. What will happen after that is anyone’s guess.

Laura Seay is an assistant professor of political science at Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia where she teaches courses on African politics, conflict, and international affairs. She also maintains an academic blog examining Africa politics, security, development and advocacy at: texasinafrica.blogspot.com. The views expressed here are her own.

In the wake of today’s contested swearing in of Joseph Kabila and competing efforts by Etienne Tshisekedi to continue to contest the polls results, the below statement released by our colleagues is worthy of particular attention.

December 20, 2011

We, the undersigned organizations and individuals, are deeply troubled by the lack of critical engagement that the international community has shown throughout the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Carter Center, the European Union, the Catholic Church and other national election observation organizations found that the elections held on November 28, 2011 were deeply flawed and marred by widespread irregularities. In order to prevent further violence and provide legitimacy to the government, we call on the United States and other members of the international community to take these immediate steps:

1) State clearly that they do not perceive the election results as legitimate and call on President Kabila to delay his inauguration ceremony until steps are taken to address these serious allegations. If the inauguration proceeds as scheduled, the United States and other international missions should consider non-attendance or at a minimum send a lower ranking diplomatic officer instead of the Ambassador.

2) Immediately ask for the deployment of an independent international mediation commission formed under international and regional auspices. The Commission will have a mandate to review the technical aspects of the electoral process and facilitate a solution to the crisis.

3) Call on the appropriate authorities to immediately halt the counting of the parliamentary election ballots until clear guarantees are put in place to ensure the credibility of the tallying process.

4) Make clear statements that the U.S. and other members of the international community are determined to ensure accountability for perpetrators of electoral and post-electoral violence in the appropriate international or national fora. Call on Congolese state security forces, in particular the Republican Guard, to cease immediately all abuses against civilians.

The following organizations and individuals support this statement:

Eastern Congo Initiative
Enough
Humanity United
International Crisis Group
Open Society Foundations
Anthony W. Gambino, Fellow, Eastern Congo Initiative
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution
Jason Stearns

By Dave Peterson

It was on Friday evening, on my way to the airport that word came over Okapi Radio that Jacques Djoli, the vice president of CENI, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s election commission, would announce the preliminary results from three provinces. When he declared that incumbent President Joseph Kabila had won Equateur, Bas Congo and Bandundu by wide margins, we were stunned. All the credible reports we had received from civil society sources suggested the exact opposite: only Bandundu should have been too close to call and Etienne Tshisekedi should have been leading by a wide margin in Bas Congo. It was clear that Kabila and his allies were stealing the election with the complicity of the commission.

Tensions had been building in the capital, Kinshasa, and voters in some areas had already burned down polling stations where ballots pre-marked for Kabila had been discovered. We knew that the pattern of fraud would likely continue, and the country was bound to explode. The final date for preliminary results was December 6, but now all bets were off. My civil society friends would be shutting up their offices and heading for cover soon. Assuming that in the ensuing chaos the government would be moving quickly to settle scores against its political opponents, as well as those in the human rights movement who had dared to criticize it, they had reason to worry.

It didn’t have to be this way.

The universal assessment was that the elections had been a reasonably successful process, despite logistical problems and unfortunate but isolated incidents of violence. Voters had been vigilant and passionate. Poll workers had done their best, and the police had been well behaved.

However, on the first day, certain instructions did not seem to have reached all the polling officials, and voter illiteracy and lack of civic education compounded the problem. Ominously, ballots and results sheets were not secured as carefully as they should have been. Some stations, especially those in opposition areas, didn’t receive enough ballots. The violence seemed consistently to be a product of voters detecting fraud. Although the process went well in Kinshasa and most of the country, there were a number of exceptions. It was reported to the UN that in Kasai Occidental, an opposition stronghold, 145 stations had been burned down, and for this reason the CENI would annul the vote there.

Nevertheless, civil society groups contended that they had been successful in persuading voters not to be seduced by gifts from politicians, but to turn out in massive numbers and vote peacefully for those best able to lead the country and not those who had committed human rights violations. They criticized politicians on all sides who had incited violence during the campaign, and urged Congolese to continue to remain calm. Tshisekedi’s followers in the streets were declaring their willingness to die for him, however, and the attitude among activists also seems to have become more fatalistic.

The international community has not emerged from the election with much credit. International funding for the process was a fraction of what it had been in 2006, and I was dismayed at how many Congolese seemed convinced that the international community favored Kabila because he would protect their interests, and had pre-determined the outcome. I was told that, although Tshisekedi might be unpredictable, and would have to be monitored closely were he to become president, he understood the West and would encourage responsible foreign investment. Some of Tshisekedi’s advisors, such as Valentin Mubake, might be problematic. But simply an alternation of power is needed, even if Tshisekedi is not the ideal president.

Kabila, on the other hand, could be depended on to continue the same system of bad governance, impunity, and massive suffering. His policies have exhausted the country. Should Kabila try to steal the election as expected, the international community would have to intervene to stop him, activists suggested, but that’s a faint hope. There has been some progress in Congo. The police have committed fewer human rights abuses, thanks to international training by the Japanese. The military has suffered as much as anyone during the past ten years, and with the exception of its top leadership, should remain neutral. Congolese are clearly showing a greater understanding of and commitment to democracy.

Congo has the resources to emerge from the current disorder. And Congolese civil society will not give up the struggle, as beleaguered as it may be. More emphasis needs to be placed on Congolese youth. The extremely high rates of unemployment, cost of education, and manipulation by politicians, such as Kabila’s sports teams, pose serious challenges. Grassroots education at the communal level and in the schools also seems important given the evident evolution in Congolese attitudes and the need to overcome the culture of corruption. Improving the accountability of local government will become increasingly meaningful assuming Congo is able to hold the provincial elections next year and local elections in 2013.

At this moment, Congo’s future hangs in the balance. Although a firm international stand against rigging by the incumbent, such as occurred a year ago in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, does not seem likely.

Preventing a descent into chaos may be the best we can hope for. Now is the time for some hard, courageous, decisions.

Dave Peterson is senior director of the National Endowment for Democracy’s Africa program. He recently returned from monitoring the election. The views expressed here are his own.

Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, November 30, 2011

The Congolese people went to the polls this week to elect a new president and a new parliament. Early indications are that the turnout was generally high with polling booths remaining open for up to two days after official closing time on November 28th. Eastern Congo Initiative (ECI) witnessed a high level of participation in the voting and celebrates that, in spite of great odds, election day was largely peaceful in the east of the country.

Given the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) vast size and lack of adequate transportation infrastructure, it is not surprising that the elections occurred with a myriad of technical and logistical problems. It seems that in much of the DRC citizens were able to vote under relatively peaceful conditions. We were encouraged by the proactive and peaceful behavior of the voters in the activities that we witnessed.

However, ECI is concerned that throughout the country the voting process was compromised by allegations of fraud, targeted violence and a simple lack of capacity of CENI to implement elections that could be considered accessible, free and fair to the entire electorate.

Represented by Founding Member Cindy McCain and Founding Member and CEO Whitney Williams, ECI witnessed first-hand in North Kivu province that many women were prevented or hindered from going to the polls. In a country where perhaps more than half of all women cannot read or write, the Electoral Commission neglected the need to assist illiterate people in gaining access to the polls. In nearly all of the polling stations we visited, especially in rural districts, many women were clearly confused as they attempted to vote. They were not aware that they could be supported by a literate assistant, and reported that they left the polling stations unable to vote. In some cases, they reported being encouraged to leave the polls but did not, instead staying for many hours hoping for the chance to cast their vote. Unfortunately, this shows that the CENI did not adequately communicate rights to illiterate voters and did not have the resources onsite to support the volume of voters with such needs.

While it is too early to pass definitive judgment on the freeness and fairness of the election, we encourage the Congolese and international observation missions to investigate if there have been any organized efforts to disenfranchise voters, especially women and the illiterate, during the 2011 elections.

As the Congolese people wait for the results of their election, it is time to consider what happens next. Fears of post-election violence are widespread and ECI calls on all parties to refrain from the use of violence to resolve political conflict.

ECI believes in Congolese solutions for Congolese challenges. This election process has shown that the Congolese people want their voices heard and that there is an overwhelming desire for good governance, security, economic opportunity, and social development.

The Congolese electorate deserves a future where their basic rights are respected, including the right to freely elect leaders of their choice and to have full confidence that the reported results accurately reflect their will. We hope that in the coming crucial weeks that these core aspects of the democratic process, which require transparency and openness, are adhered to by election officials.

The Eastern Congo Initiative is a U.S.-based advocacy and grantmaking initiative that believes local, community-based approaches are essential to creating a sustainable and successful society in eastern Congo.

This blog post is the first in a series by several leading analysts on Congo who the Museum has invited to contribute their thoughts, news, and observations regarding potential threats to civilians during Congo's elections and the potentially tumultuous period following the vote. The views expressed are the authors'.

Congolese voters go to the polls choose legislative and presidential leaders for the second time on Monday, November 28. As several analysts have noted, the risk of election-related violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo is significant. The month-long campaign period has already resulted in serious violence, with up to ten dead in Kinshasa over the weekend and several protests being met with violent responses from the police and military. Some Congo-watchers believe violence will be short-term, sporadic, and limited to urban zones, while others fear violence could spread rapidly. Are these fears well-founded?

Congolese citizens already live under some of the worst humanitarian conditions in the world. Their country ranks dead last on this year's UNDP Human Development Index, which measures quality-of-life indicators like income, health, and education levels. One in five Congolese infants die before their fifth birthday, more than one in ten infants die in childbirth, and life expectancy for both men and women is less than fifty years. Simply being born Congolese puts a citizen at high risk of dying an untimely death from preventable causes.

These appalling statistics result from a combination of factors, including poor governance, lack of access to employment and financial resources, and the lingering effects of state collapse and of the country's wars. As such, elections are a key marker in Congo's progress towards rebuilding the state, re-establishing governance, and improving the lives of its civilians over the long-term.

The same elections that are necessary to continue D.R. Congo's transition to democracy also pose risks, however, and the potential for post-electoral violence may cause even more problems in the short, medium, and long runs. At issue is the fact that the country is deeply divided in its support for the eleven presidential candidates, including incumbent President Joesph Kabila. Kabila, who came to power after his father's assassination in 2001 and was democratically elected in 2006, is deeply unpopular, particularly in the western Congo, which includes the capital Kinshasa. There, support is divided among ten opposition candidates, the most prominent of whom are the UDPS party's Etienne Tshisekedi and Vital Kamerhe, who hails from the east. Tshisekedi, who stood up to Mobutu and, at 78 is the oldest of the candidates, sees himself as the rightful heir to Congo's presidency. He enjoys strong support in Kinshasa as well as in the Kasai provinces, which are home to the ethnic group from which Tshisekedi hails, the Luba.

Kabila won in 2006 with strong support from the eastern Congo, where voters speak his Kiswahili language and from where his family hails. This year, however, eastern Congolese voters are disillusioned with Kabila's rule. They have not seen as many benefits from Kabila's 2006 promises of increased stability and better infrastructure, and many voters there will not support him at the polls. Because Kabila knows his re-election is at risk, his supporters in Parliament changed the Constitution earlier this year to allow the president to win with a simple plurality of the vote rather than a majority, which means that no candidate has to attain fifty percent plus one of the vote. Rather, whoever gets the most votes will win.

Why might this result in violence? First, few in Kinshasa believe that Kabila can win fairly. Those voters are probably wrong; Kabila is likely to legitimately win 30-35% of the vote nationwide, but almost all of his support will come from outside of Kinshasa. Reality often matters less than perception, however, and the perception in Kinshasa will be that if Kabila wins the election, he must have stolen it. Given that outcome, Kinois voters are likely to take to the streets demanding that Kabila step down, and they will likely be met with a violent response from Kabila's presidential guard.

More potential for violence exists in the reaction of authorities and civilians to perceptions of irregularities and fraud in the voting process. Already, reports are coming in of hundreds of thousands of names being missing from voter rolls and rumors are flying that ballot papers have been pre-marked and that pens at the polling stations are filled with erasable ink. A number of polling stations had not received ballots as of Sunday night, meaning that voters in those regions will be completely disenfranchised. If Congolese civilians do not feel that their votes are cast and counted in an ethical and fair manner, some may take to the streets in protest.

The other potential for violence comes much later. As Chatham House's Ben Shepherd notes, local and provincial elections are scheduled in 2012 and 2013, and these may provoke significantly more violence in more places as voters express their frustrations about the country's lack of progress.

Is violence inevitable in the Congo this week or in the weeks to come? Not necessarily. The country enjoys a distinct advantage over 2006 in that none of the major presidential candidates still maintain private armies, as was the case with Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC militia last time around. But politics in the country are still not settled on the basis of the rule of law, corruption is still rampant, and few feel that the electoral process reflects their wishes for the country's future. These factors do not bode well for a peaceful electoral process.

Laura Seay is an assistant professor of political science at Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia where she teaches courses on African politics, conflict, and international affairs. She also maintains an academic blog examining Africa politics, security, development and advocacy at: texasinafrica.blogspot.com. The views expressed here are her own.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on November 28, 2011. These elections could to lead to opportunities for peace, stability and growth—or plummet the country back into economic, political, and social upheaval.

A number of outstanding issues cast doubt on whether the current electoral process will meet the expectations of Congolese citizens and satisfy basic international standards. Current concerns include:

1. The ability of the Congolese Electoral Commission to organize and deliver voting materials to polling stations on time
2. Procedures in place to enable illiterate voters to vote for themselves and cast their ballots in secret
3. Fair access to the media for all candidates
4. The promotion of a peaceful environment free of violence and intimidation against candidates
5. Transparent safeguards to deter and catch attempts at electoral fraud

In a recent Eastern Congo Initiative report, Congo experts Anthony Gambino and Mvemba Dizolele provided recommendations on how to resolve these issues.

Read the report