You don't have to do everything in order to do something. I've already mentioned Orwell, who has long been a favorite writer of mine. But this presented me with a serious problem: If you grow up reading Orwell, and you set out to write your own book, you are in trouble: He set the bar too damn high. Some influences can be paralyzing. But a few years ago I came across an essay on Orwell by Lionel Trilling that liberated me, reminding me of Orwell's magnetic ordinariness.

Trilling wrote: "If we ask what it is [Orwell] stands for, what he is the figure of, the answer is: the virtue of not being a genius, of fronting the world with nothing more than one's simple, direct, undeceived intelligence, and a respect for the powers one does have, and the work one undertakes to do.... He is not a genius--what a relief! What an encouragement. For he communicates to us the sense that what he has done, any one of us could do."

With Trilling's words I was able to embark upon writing A Problem From Hell. I was unleashed to do what I could do. I could do no more. But I also knew I should do no less.

For most Darfurians, Abdul Wahid, not Minni Minawi, is the symbol of the "revolution." If either of the two factional leaders has a political vision it is Abdul Wahid, no matter how poor his leadership skills and how chaotic and unreliable his negotiating style. Minawi’s Zaghawa are at most 8 percent of the population of Darfur and are themselves divided; Abdul Wahid’s Fur, historic rulers of the sultanate which gives Darfur its name, comprise 26-30 percent and are more cohesive. If either man has support outside his own tribe, it is Abdul Wahid. Not one of his key negotiators at the inter-Sudanese peace talks in Abuja was Fur; Minawi’s, by contrast, were all Zaghawa.

Particularly alarming is that the Government reverted to using helicopter gunships on various occasions and reports that a white Antonov plane dropped bombs on the village of Joghana (Gereida area in South Darfur) on 24 April. In attacks by militia where there was no clear Government involvement, the Government repeatedly failed in its obligations under international law to prevent them. While there is an abundance of State security forces in Darfur, there is an almost total lack of Government forces addressing the problem of human security.

The credibility of the [Darfur Peace] agreement lies in making sure the undertakings are applied. We must lose no more time. If there is any doubt, everything comes into question.

What I saw in Darfur and Eastern Chad drove home how much really now is at stake. The next few weeks will be absolutely critical for millions of lives in this region. With the Darfur Peace Agreement signed the day before I arrived in Sudan, there is finally real hope that we are turning the corner. But we can also still enter a downward spiral that will pull millions even further into the abyss. The alternative to peace could be catastrophic. With even more violence and attacks, the humanitarian operation could not be sustained, and relief workers would have to withdraw. Malnutrition and mortality rates would again multiply, in some areas within weeks and not months.

With so much at stake, all of us will regret if we fail to do everything we can right now to achieve the immediate goals we all agree on: implement the peace agreement and bring on board those who have not signed it; immediately and substantially strengthen AMIS; take concrete steps to accelerate transition to a UN operation; and make sure that the humanitarian lifeline to more than three million people is secure and funded.

has lost the ability to assure the security of some areas along the border, and to ensure the security and integrity of refugee camps, and the safety of humanitarian workers. . . . They admit themselves that they are overstretched. They recognise the responsibility they have to protect people, but also that to fulfil all their responsibilities is impossible. . . . There is a security vacuum at the moment, and it must be addressed.