ushmm.org
What are you looking for?
Search
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Museum info Education Research History Remembrance Conscience Join and donate
Home
Alert
History
News
Analysis
Photos
Calendar
About Us
Home >> Analysis >> Blog

A bi-weekly audio series and podcast service, hosted by Committee on Conscience Project Director Bridget Conley-Zilkic, that brings you the voices of human rights defenders, experts, advocates, and government officials. Vital voices addressing one of humanity's most vital issues. The opinions expressed in these interviews do not necessarily represent those of the Museum.

Page 2 of 17 pages  <  1 2 3 4 >  Last »


Danse Macabre
Earlier this week, Sudanese President Bashir ostensibly agreed to the second of three phases in deploying a hybrid UN-AU force to protect civilians in Darfur. This so-called "heavy support" package would provide much needed assistance to an African Union force that increasingly cannot protect itself, much less civilians. Any optimism about this "step forward" has to be tempered by the fact that Bashir agreed to this phase months ago, then dragged his feet before reneging altogether. So he in effect is re-agreeing after unconscionable delay. One wonders how long it will be before the package is fully deployed. And Bashir continues to reject completely the most important, third phase of the deployment, which would increase the number of troops on the ground to protect civilians to around 20,000.

In any event, a stark reminder (if one were needed) of the worthlessness of Sudanese government promises and its contempt for the UN Security Council is provided by a confidential UN report that was leaked to the New York Times on Tuesday. As the Times summarizes:
A confidential United Nations report says the government of Sudan is flying arms and heavy military equipment into Darfur in violation of Security Council resolutions and painting Sudanese military planes white to disguise them as United Nations or African Union aircraft.
The report also documents the use of white aircraft to bomb villages. You may recall that the promise to stop bombing people from airplanes painted white was a supposed "step forward" earlier this year. In a few hours, President Bush will address Darfur at the Holocaust Museum. Undoubtedly, this week's step forward was meant to influence what he says. What should be clear beyond any doubt is that in Bashir's dance of death and deceit, every apparent step forward is usually followed by one or more steps back.

(Photo of Sudanese government plane disguised as UN plane from Interim Report of UN Panel of Experts.)


What the Committee on Conscience Staff is Reading
Slaughterhouse-Five, by Kurt Vonnegut. In memory of the recent author (Jackie Scutari).

Be Not Afraid, for You Have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the U.S. into the Kosovo War, by Stacy Sullivan (Bridget Conley-Zilkic).

The Somulus Option, by Samuel S. Hallman (John Heffernan).

Watching and listening to TEDtalks. Most recently: Hans Rosling explain how the Gapminder project brings United Nations data to life to understand our changing world; Larry Brilliant discuss the successful World Health Organization campaign to eradicate Smallpox; and James Nachtwey talk about his decades as a war photographer (David Klevan).

David Howarth, 1066: The Year of the Conquest. A concise, lucid history of the Battle of Hastings, rich in anecdotal detail. Howarth relies on the few medieval sources available to reconstruct the events leading up to and the consequences of the famous battle (Matthew Levinger).

Apocalypse Now
UN refugee official Matthew Conway described for the BBC his visit to two Chadian villages that were attacked on March 31:
It was shocking, apocalyptic - a scene of utter desolation and destruction. Attacks like this happen repeatedly, but the scale of this one and the ferocity of it was startling - even to those of us who have been here for some time. These were fairly large villages and clearly relatively prosperous: rich agricultural fields; neatly assembled houses and they were more or less completely destroyed in these attacks. Hundreds upon hundreds of homes had been burned to the ground, and a small fire was still burning in one section of Tiero village.

Evidence collected so far indicates it was a two-pronged attack - very well co-ordinated and premeditated. It happened at first light so the villagers were caught totally unawares. Some of the men would have been at mosque for morning prayers. From one direction came the so-called Janjaweed militia on horseback and camelback - whether these were Janjaweed from Sudan or Chad, it is hard to know. It appears that they consisted of a mix of various ethnicities, not solely Arab, and in some cases the assailants were known to the villagers. The other prong of the attack appears to have been led by an unknown faction of Chadian rebels. They were wearing military uniforms, were very well armed and arrived in vehicles.

Sadly, I don't think we're ever going to know the exact number of those who died as people fled in different directions. Estimates now put the death toll at between 200 to 400. A lot of bodies were buried in common graves simply as a necessity because of decomposition occurring in the intense heat. These communal graves are scattered in all different directions mainly along the roadside where people were killed and then buried by their kin who were able to get back there. Many who survived the initial attack, died in subsequent days from exhaustion and dehydration. Along the route to the villages abandoned belongings can be seen of those who collapsed. People displaced by other raids had been living in the villages alongside local residents. Tiero had a combined population of 4,000 and Marena of about 3,500.
The total number of Chadian civilians displaced from their homes now numbers around 140,000. The continued metastisizing of the violence beyond Khartoum's genocidal assault against certain ethnic groups in Darfur means that both the scale of human destruction and the difficulty of establishing peace and security are increasing apace.

Erasing History
If you were heading over to the UN to see the exhibit on the Rwanda genocide put up by our friends at Aegis Trust, hold your horses. The exhibit was dismantled even before it was opened because Turkey objected to the assertion in a background section that “following World War I, during which one million Armenians were murdered in Turkey,” Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer credited with coining the word genocide, “urged the League of Nations to recognize crimes of barbarity as international crimes.” Note that the exhibit apparently does not label the massacres of Armenians as genocide; rather it implies a causal relationship between the violence and Raphael Lemkin's ultimate coining of the word "genocide." That happens to be, however inconvenient it is for the Turkish government, the truth. As explained elsewhere on our website, Lemkin's memoirs "detail early exposure to the history of Ottoman attacks against Armenians (which most scholars believe constitute genocide), anti-Semitic pogroms, and other histories of group-targeted violence as key to forming his beliefs about the need for legal protection of groups. " (Hat tip: K.M.)

(Photo of Raphael Lemkin)

See For Yourself
The Holocaust Memorial Museum joined with Google today to launch an unprecedented online mapping initiative using Google Earth technology. Photographs, eyewitness testimony and other information are combined with high-resolution satellite imagery to show the scope of destruction in Darfur in a new and immediate way. Check it out.

Rough Start
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon marked the 13th anniversary of the beginning of the Rwanda genocide with what seems to me to be, even by UN standards, a remarkably formulaic, cliche ridden statement, the essence of which is that we should "never forget" and "never stop working to prevent another genocide." No reference to preventing genocide in any particular place, of course, and especially no reference to the whatchamacallit in Darfur. He did say that he intended to make the currently part-time position of Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide into a full time gig (his one example of fulfilling the stated imperative to do "more, much more"). Meanwhile, Monday's LA Times had a summary of the rough seas that Ban has been sailing in his first three months in office. Money quote:
On his recent trip to the Middle East, he was stonewalled by the Iranian foreign minister, snubbed by the Palestinian finance minister, misaddressed by the prime ministers of Israel and Lebanon, and shaken by a mortar shell's near-miss in Baghdad. Back home, a mutiny against his first major reform left him similarly shaken and humbled. . . . [S]o far, his cryptic decision-making style at home and his why-can't-we-all-just-get-along approach abroad has diplomats wondering how effective the new secretary-general will be.
Not surprisingly, Darfur provides a particularly incisive case study in futility for the new SG:
When he met Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir in January, the secretary-general said he looked him in the eye and told him it was unacceptable for the violence to continue in Darfur and that he must live up to his agreement to allow peacekeepers into the western region.

"I made this case as hard as I could. He made his personal commitment to me that he will implement this agreement," Ban said.

A few weeks later, Bashir wrote a letter to Ban gutting his previous commitments to accept the joint U.N.-African Union peacekeeping force.
A lesser diplomat might have felt, I don't know, angered by such treatment. But Ban didn't let it faze him. He persevered and apparently got Bashir to say (maybe "personally commit"?) that he would accept 20,000 AU troops, but not under UN command. Bashir knows full well that the AU doesn't have anywhere near that number of troops to provide and that without substantial international participation there can be no effective civilian protection. Bashir knows that, but Ban apparently does not. "I think we broke the stalemate," he said.

Last week, after five AU soldiers were killed in Darfur and with attacks on AU forces on the rise, AU Commission head Alpha Oumar Konare warned that "it has become imperative and unavoidable, in the present circumstances, to speedily implement the [hybrid UN-AU] approach to the peacekeeping operation in Darfur." This week, a parade of diplomats -- including Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, Chinese envoy Zai Jun and South African President Thabo Mbeki -- is passing through Khartoum to push for the deployment of a hybrid force. So far, though, Khartoum's defiance has been without consequence for the Sudanese government.

(Photo of Ban Ki-Moon © UN.)

Blind Justice
As discussed in my recent interview with law professor Diane Orentlicher, the International Court of Justice in The Hague in February handed down its decision in a long-pending case in which the government of Bosnia accused the government of Serbia of responsibility for genocide during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. I won't rehash the details again, but Diane observed that the ICJ's judgment absolving the Serbian government for genocide or complicity in genocide was "perplexing," characterized by the recounting of a large amount of evidence but relatively little legal analysis of that evidence's significance. Rather the Court basically relied on decisions made by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the context of individual criminal cases. Now, a lengthy story in Sunday's New York Times focuses on the fact that the ICJ did not have before it potentially significant records concerning high level deliberations held during the war in the Serbian capital of Belgrade. Serbian authorities specifically withheld this evidence from the ICJ, which refused Bosnian requests that it demand the information be turned over:
Lawyers interviewed in The Hague and Belgrade said that the outcome might well have been different had the International Court of Justice pressed for access to the full archives, and legal scholars and human rights groups said it was deeply troubling that the judges did not subpoena the documents directly from Serbia. . . . “It’s a question that nags loudly,” Diane Orentlicher, a law professor at American University in Washington, said recently in The Hague. “Why didn’t the court request the full documents? The fact that they were blacked out clearly implies these passages would have made a difference.”
A crucial issue in the ICJ case was the amount of control that Belgrade exercised over the Bosnian Serbs, and lawyers who have seen the withheld evidence told the Times that it "reveals in new and vivid detail how Belgrade financed and supplied the war in Bosnia, and how the Bosnian Serb army, though officially separate after 1992, remained virtually an extension of the Yugoslav Army. They said the archives showed in verbatim records and summaries of meetings that Serbian forces, including secret police, played a role in the takeover of Srebrenica and in the preparation of the massacre there."

One explanation offered by observers for the Court's refusal to ask for the evidence is that it did not want to be embarrassed by a Serbian refusal to provide the information. It is difficult to see how Serbian defiance would have been more embarrassing for the Court than the current situation, where it is exposed as having not even tried to obtain highly relevant information before rendering judgment on state responsibility for mass murder.

The, shall we say, elliptical legal reasoning of the ICJ's decision was already destined to make even more vexing the difficult question of what constitutes genocide as defined in international law. Even worse to learn that the judgment was rendered after a conscious decision not to obtain all the relevant facts.

(Photo of Peace Palace in The Hague, seat of the ICJ.)

What the Committee on Conscience Staff is Reading
Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases (Matt Levinger).

Executive Summary: “Understanding Conflict and Building Peace," published by International Alert, a UK based peacebuilding organization (Jackie Scutari).

We, by Yevgeny Zamyatin (Jerry Fowler).

Be Not Afraid, for You Have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the U.S. into the Kosovo War, by Stacy Sullivan (Bridget Conley-Zilkic).

"Seeing Around Corners", by Jonathan Rauch from the April 2002 issue of The Atlantic. The new science of artificial societies suggests that real ones are both more predictable and more surprising than we thought. Growing long-vanished civilizations and modern-day genocides on computers will probably never enable us to foresee the future in detail — but we might learn to anticipate the kinds of events that lie ahead, and where to look for interventions that might work (David Klevan).

Best Laid (or Not) Plans
The State Department said on Thursday that its number 2 official, Deputy Secretary John Negroponte, will travel to Libya, Chad and Sudan itself next week to discuss Darfur. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack says that Negroponte "is going to encourage Khartoum to give the green light to the AU/U.N. hybrid package." One would like to think that "encourage" is something of an understatement used for effect, but probably not. McCormack ventured that he is "sure" that Negroponte will have "a direct conversation with the Sudanese leadership over where they stand vis-a-vis the international system." Then he got so bold as to allow that he "would not bet against the United States as well as others taking additional steps" if the Sudanese don't shape up. Yes, but would he bet on additional steps? Or is the point that he just is not a betting man?

This trip comes as the much discussed "Plan B" hangs fire. WaPo's Jackson Diehl reported last week that "President Bush's anger rocked the Oval Office when aides presented him with" what they had come up with after months of suggesting that Khartoum would be in big trouble for its continuing defiance.
Raising his voice, he demanded that his special envoy for Darfur, Andrew Natsios, and national security adviser Stephen Hadley come up with something stronger.
But in response to a new US-UK determination to seek sanctions from the Security Council, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon asked for more time for negotiations. That's understandable. After all, he apparently has only been lied to once by Sudanese President Bashir during his first three months in office. No reason why he should see, shall we say, a pattern.

What the Committee on Conscience Staff is Reading
A Dirty War in Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone by Lansane Gbire (Jerry Fowler).

Numbed by Numbers, by Paul Slovic. People don’t ignore mass killings because they lack compassion. Psychological research suggests it’s grim statistics themselves that paralyze us into inaction. (John Heffernan).

Joyce E. Leader's Rwanda’s Struggle for Democracy and Peace, 1991-1994 (Matthew Levinger).

William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Matthew Levinger).

The Answer to Darfur: How to Resolve the World’s Hottest War, by John Prendergast (Jackie Scutari).

"World’s Cruelty and Pain, Seen in an Unblinking Lens," a New York Times article about James Nachtwey (Michael Graham).

How the U.S. Can Use Strategic Diplomacy to Break the Deadlock and Protect Darfur Now, from Africa Action's Report: Leveraging New International Action on Darfur - December 14, 2006 (David Klevan).

Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster, by Millard Burr and Robert Collins (Lisa Rogoff).

The journals of small business owners in the developing world on Kiva: Loans that Change Lives. Nick Kristof's column this Tuesday focused on "do it yourself foreign aid," and highlighted this web site where individuals can make loans to small businesses, get reports on how each business is doing (and even visit and sample the business' products), and eventually be repaid on the loan.

Pimp My . . . You Know, My Whatchamacallit
A colleague recently called my attention to a screed titled "Pimp My Genocide." The author, a writer named Brendan O'Neill, made a few interesting points about politicization of the term "genocide" (newsflash -- genocide involves politics!) in what was otherwise a rather bizarre rant that left me scratching my head. I thought maybe the guy spends most of his time in some alternative reality that resembles ours, but is still different. Then I found an interview with Mr. O'Neill on NPR's On The Media where he drops this stink bomb in discussing the Armenian genocide:
But it's not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a genocide, in the sense that there was a concerted attempt by the Turkish authorities to destroy every single Armenian.
Oh, dear. That's the kind of statement of revealing ignorance that every blowhard must dread making on national radio, if he stopped bloviating long enough to worry about what he's actually saying. As most readers of this blog will know, "genocide" as defined in international law accepted the world over (which is the only definition really relevant to public policy debates) is violence committed with the intent to destroy a group "in whole or in part." Now the question of what "in part" means raises a lot of problems, and generates many of the "is it or isn't it?" debates that can be so fruitless and distracting and, yes, politically charged. But the issue of whether something is genocide simply does not turn on whether perpetrators intended "to destroy every single" member of the target group.

Brendan O'Neill is certainly free to defend mass murderers on the ground that they did not intend "to destroy every single" one of their potential victims. But he needs to come up with his own term for the crime they haven't committed.

What the Committee on Conscience Staff is Reading
Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb by David Luban (Jerry Fowler).

Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda, by Nigel Eltringham (Jackie Scutari).

Sudan: The Question of Land, by Alex de Waal. Natural resources and scarcity of land remain a critical factor in the Darfur conflict, and without an agreement on land division, there can be no end to the violence. In this article, Alex de Waal explores how the DPA addresses this issue (Lisa Rogoff).

What the Committee on Conscience Staff is Reading
The Helsinki Effect, by Daniel Thomas (Jerry Fowler).

Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, by John Paul Lederach (Jackie Scutari).

"The Real Roots of Darfur" in The Atlantic Monthly by Stephan Faris. Faris argues that although the violence in Darfur is usually attributed to ethnic hatred, global warming may be primarily to blame (David Klevan).

John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen's essay in Foreign Affairs, "Blowing the Horn," which details Washington's failures in Sudan and Somalia and how these failures have impacted the greater horn of Africa (Lisa Rogoff).

Talk Back
Just a reminder -- this week's interview with former Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck is the second of three episodes that we are producing in conjunction with Facing History and Ourselves. Facing History is doing an online seminar, including online discussions with our guests. You can sign up for the seminar here.

Not News and Not Good
The "High-Level Mission" led by Nobel Prize-winner Jody Williams that the UN Human Rights Council dispatched to investigate Darfur reported back on Monday with the conclusion that was already obvious:
The High-Level Mission concludes that the situation of human rights in Darfur remains grave, and the corresponding needs profound. The situation is characterized by gross and systematic violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law. War crimes and crimes against humanity continue across the region. The principal pattern is one of a violent counterinsurgency campaign waged by the Government of the Sudan in concert with Janjaweed/militia, and targeting mostly civilians. Rebel forces are also guilty of serious abuses of human rights and violations of humanitarian law. . . . The Mission further concludes that the Government of the Sudan has manifestly failed to protect the population of Darfur from large-scale international crimes, and has itself orchestrated and participated in these crimes. As such, the solemn obligation of the international community to exercise its responsibility to protect has become evident and urgent.
(Boldface and italics in original) Though the conclusion was obvious, that doesn't mean it will be accepted. Moves were reportedly afoot in the Human Rights Council to reject the report, apparently because it is too critical of Khartoum.

One detail in the report brilliantly captures both the brazeness of the Sudanese government and the impotence of the so-called international community. When Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir met with new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon at the end of January, Bashir provided "his personal commitment and assurance that the Sudan would fully cooperate with the Mission as constituted." Like so many other commitments made by Bashir, this one was, well, not to be believed. According to the Mission's report,
All in all, more than a dozen attempts over the twenty-day period from 26 January through 14 February 2007 were made in Geneva, Addis Ababa and Khartoum to obtain our visas [to travel to Sudan] and secure the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan. Upon our return to Geneva, we continued to offer cooperation, seeking briefings and information from Government officials, but to no avail.

Page 2 of 17 pages  <  1 2 3 4 >  Last »