Preventing Genocide

On this day nine years ago, the Rwanda "Media Trial" opened at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Three Rwandan journalists stood before the judges, accused of using the media to spread hate speech and directly incite violence during the 1994 genocide. The trial raised important questions about the nature of speech and genocide: Did media directly influence the killing? What speech is protected under the freedom of the press? How can the intent behind words be determined? In a landmark decision, ICTR judges ultimately convicted all three men of direct and public incitement to genocide, one of several punishable acts outlined in the Genocide Convention. Handing down the verdict, the ICTR judges declared to the men, "Without a firearm, machete, or any physical weapon, you caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians."

A newly published article in the Holocaust Encyclopedia, "Incitement to Genocide in International Law", traces the history and development of this crime's definition, from its foundation in the trials of major Nazi war criminals following the Holocaust and WWII to current debates over its use. In a second important trial at the ICTR, on December 2, 2008, ICTR judges found Rwandan composer and singer Simon Bikindi not guilty for his songs espousing hatred of Tutsi. However, they did convict him for statements he made on a loudspeaker in the Rwanda countryside during the genocide. The case demonstrated the difficulty of determining the implications and intent of speech.

Senior prosecutor for the ICTR and profiled here in our gallery of eyewitness testimonies, Stephen Rapp described the significance of issues raised during the Media Trial, "A key question is what kind of speech is protected and where the limits lie. It is important to draw that line. We hope the judgment will give the world some guidance."

On October 19, the Obama Administration unveiled a new strategy toward Sudan, which aims to end the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, as well as ensure the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The new policy promises to offer incentives if Khartoum makes progress and "increased pressure" if it does not.

They cited several critical lessons from past dealings with the government of Sudan:

• The United States cannot succeed in achieving our policy by focusing exclusively on Darfur or CPA implementation -- both must be addressed seriously and simultaneously, while also working to resolve and prevent conflict throughout Sudan.
• United States policy must be agile enough to address discrete emergency crises, while maintaining a sustained focus on long-term stability.
• To advance peace and security in Sudan, we must engage with allies and with those with whom we disagree. United States diplomacy must be both sustained and broad, encompassing not just the National Congress Party, SPLM, and major Darfuri rebel groups but also critical regional and international actors.
• Assessments of progress and decisions regarding incentives and disincentives must not be based on process-related accomplishments (i.e., the signing of a MOU or the issuance of a set of visas), but rather based on verifiable changes in conditions on the ground.
• Accountability for genocide and atrocities is necessary for reconciliation and lasting peace.
• It must be clear to all parties that Sudanese support for counterterrorism objectives is valued, but cannot be used as a bargaining chip to evade responsibilities in Darfur or implementing the CPA.

And outlines what their priorities will be moving forward:

1. A definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur.
2. Implementation of the North-South CPA that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other.
3. Ensure that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.

To learn more, read coverage of the new strategy in The New York Times and The Washington Post.

With inter-ethnic clashes in South Sudan and the nation as a whole bracing itself for upcoming elections, the western region of Darfur has been reminded that the war is not over. In mid-September, attacks by the Sudan Armed Forces around Korma North Darfur were reported to have killed 16 civilians, wounded dozens more, and destroyed several villages. An estimated 2.7 million people still live in displaced persons camps in Darfur and 200,000 refugees remain in Chad, unable to return home for fear of precisely this kind of violence between the rebel groups and the Sudanese government.

Efforts to address the current situation in Sudan continued this month with an international conference on Sudan in Moscow, attended by the UN, AU, and League of Arab States. Peace talks on Darfur are set to resume by the end of October in Doha.

Following Natalya Estemirova's murder in Grozny last July, the human rights group Memorial accused Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov of involvement in her death. Kadyrov subsequently sued Memorial Director Oleg Orlov for libel.

This week, a district court in Moscow awarded the suit to President Kadyrov and ordered Orlov to pay damages, as well as retract his statements. The court rejected arguments that Orlov's accusations were justified "based on Mr. Kadyrov's record of human rights violations and his well-known hostile relationship with Ms. Estemirova." Orlov has promised to appeal the decision, applying to the European Court of Human Rights if necessary.

Reinforcing Kadyrov's stronghold grip on the region, the court's decision has also emboldened the leader to make additional moves against his enemies. He now plans to file a libel suit against the newspaper Novaya Gazeta, which had employed Anna Politkovskaya, a human rights activist who was murdered in 2006.

One of the most wanted suspects in the 1994 genocide was arrested in Uganda this week and extradited to Tanzania to face trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The head of intelligence and military operations at Rwanda's elite military training school during the genocide, Idelphonse Nizeyimana was indicted by the ICTR in 2000 and charged with crimes against humanity, as well as complicity in genocide and direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The indictment charged that:

From late 1990 until July 1994, military personnel, members of the government, political leaders, civil servants and other personalities conspired among themselves and with others to work out a plan with the intent to exterminate the civilian Tutsi population... In executing the plan, they organized, ordered and participated in the massacres perpetrated against the Tutsi population and moderate Hutus. Idelphonse Nizeyimana elaborated, adhered to and executed this plan.

Nizeyimana was also specifically accused of establishing "secret units of extremist elements" to help carry out the genocide.

Hiding out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the genocide, Nizeyimana served as a top commander in the FDLR, a rebel army comprised of perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide and responsible for countless atrocities across eastern Congo.

To learn more about the FDLR and its impact on the Congo, visit World is Witness.

On November 20, 2006, the Museum projected wall-sized images of the escalating genocide in Darfur onto its facade, the first time the national memorial's exterior was used to highlight contemporary genocide. A unique and highly symbolic Museum project, the program was called "Darfur: Who Will Survive Today?" Appearing on the Museum's walls that night were images taken in Darfur and neighboring Chad by eight different photographers, including Istanbul-based photojournalist Lynsey Addario.

This past week, the MacArthur Foundation awarded Addario a $500,000 "genius grant" for her work in "exposing the tragic consequences of human conflict."

View Addario's photographs and others from that November night.

On September 21, the Will to Intervene Project, developed jointly by General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of the UN peacekeeping force for Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, and the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies released its final report, "Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership and Action to Prevent Mass Atrocities." According to the Montreal Institute's website, the goal of the Will to Intervene Project is:

...to understand how to operationalize the principles of the Canadian-sponsored Report of the International Commission on Intervention and States Sovereignty on the Responsibility to Protect [2001]. Research will focus on how to better mobilize domestic political will in Canada and the United States. Furthermore, practical tools will be designed for nongovernmental agencies, the media, and interested groups, and the general public so they can effectively pressure governments to take action to prevent future genocides and other crimes against humanity.

The work of the Will to Intervene Project also complements the Genocide Prevention Task Force report, published in 2008 by the Museum, USIP, and the American Academy for Diplomacy, and signals a growing movement to transform the idea of preventing and responding to genocide into practical policy options.

Learn more about how you can take action to make a difference.